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Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: 
Evidence from a Field Experiment 
BY BENJAMIN EDELMAN, MICHAEL LUCA, AND DAN SVIRSKY* 
In an experiment on Airbnb, we find that applications from guests with 
distinctively African-American names are 16% less likely to be accepted 
relative to identical guests with distinctively White names. Discrimination 
occurs among landlords of all sizes, including small landlords sharing the 
property and larger landlords with multiple properties.  It is most 
pronounced among hosts who have never had an African-American guest, 
suggesting only a subset of hosts discriminate. While rental markets have 
achieved significant reductions in discrimination in recent decades, our 
results suggest that Airbnb’s current design choices facilitate 
discrimination and raise the possibility of erasing some of these civil rights 
gains.  
* Edelman: Harvard Business School, Morgan 462, 25 Harvard Way, Boston MA 02163 (bedelman@hbs.edu).  Luca: Harvard 
Business School, Baker Library 457, 10 Harvard Way, Boston MA 02163 (mluca@hbs.edu). Svirsy: Harvard Business School and 
Harvard University Department of Economics, Baker Library 420A, 25 Harvard Way, Boston MA 02163 (dsvirsky@hbs.edu). We 
thank Ian Ayres, Larry Katz, Kevin Lang, Sendhil Mullainathan, Devah Pager, and seminar participants at eBay, Harvard Law School, 
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Indiana University, New York University, Northwestern University, Stanford 
University, and University at Albany for valuable feedback. We thank Haruka Uchida for tireless research assistance. 
Over the past fifty years, there have been considerable societal efforts to reduce the 
level of discrimination against African-Americans in the United States. In the context of 
housing and rental accommodations, antidiscrimination laws have sought to eliminate 
discrimination through regulation. While racial discrimination continues to exist in rental 
markets, it has improved in the last two decades (Yinger 1998, U.S. Dep’t of Housing 
and Urban Development, 2012; compare Zhao et al., 2005 to Ondrich et al., 1999). 
Yet in recent years, markets have changed dramatically, with a growing share of 
transactions moving online. In the context of housing, Airbnb has created a new market 
for short-term rentals that did not previously exist, allowing small landlords to 
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increasingly enter the market. Whereas antidiscrimination laws ban the landlord of a 
large apartment building from discriminating based on race, the prevailing view among 
legal scholars is that such laws likely do not reach many of the smaller landlords using 
Airbnb (Belzer & Leong, forthcoming; Todisco, 2015).    
In this paper, we investigate the existence and extent of racial discrimination on 
Airbnb, the canonical example of the sharing economy. Airbnb allows hosts to rent out 
houses, apartments, or rooms within an apartment. To facilitate these transactions, Airbnb 
promotes properties to prospective guests, facilitates communication, and handles 
payment and some aspects of customer service. Airbnb allows hosts to decide whether to 
accept or reject a guest after seeing his or her name and often a picture – a market design 
choice that may further enable discrimination.   
To test for discrimination, we conduct a field experiment in which we inquire about the 
availability of roughly 6,400 listings on Airbnb across five cities. Specifically, we create 
guest accounts that differ by name but are otherwise identical. Drawing on the 
methodology of a labor market experiment by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), we 
select two sets of names—one distinctively African-American and the other distinctively 
White.1  
We find widespread discrimination against guests with distinctively African-American 
names. African-American guests received a positive response roughly 42% of the time, 
compared to roughly 50% for White guests. 2 This 8 percentage point (roughly 16%) 
penalty for African-American guests is particularly noteworthy when compared to the 
discrimination-free setting of competing short-term accommodation platforms such as 
                                                 
1 We build on the large literature using audit studies to test for discrimination. Past research considers African-Americans and 
applicants with prison records in the labor market (Pager 2003), immigrants in the labor market (Oreopoulos 2011), Arabic job-
seekers (Carlsson & Rooth 2007), gender (Lahey 2008), long-term unemployment (Ghayad 2014), and going to a for-profit college 
(Deming et al. 2016), among many others.  
2 Some caution is warranted here. We only observe a gap between distinctively white and distinctively African-American names, 
which differ not only by suggested ethnicity but also potentially by socioeconomic status (Fryer and Levitt, 2004). For ease of 
exposition, we describe our results in terms of differences among the “African-American guests” or the “white guests,” or use the term 
“race gap,” without also specifying that our results may better be described as a “race and socioeconomic status gap.” Section 5 
discusses this issue in more detail. 
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Expedia. The penalty is consistent with the racial gap found in contexts ranging from 
labor markets to online lending to classified ads to taxicabs.3  
Combining our experimental results with observational data from Airbnb’s site, we 
investigate whether different types of hosts discriminate more, and whether 
discrimination is more common at certain types of properties based on price or local 
demographics. Our results are remarkably persistent. Both African-American and White 
hosts discriminate against African-American guests; both male and female hosts 
discriminate; both male and female African-American guests are discriminated against. 
Effects persist both for hosts that offer an entire property and for hosts who share the 
property with guests. Discrimination persists among experienced hosts, including those 
with multiple properties and those with many reviews. Discrimination persists and is of 
similar magnitude in high and low priced units, in diverse and homogeneous 
neighborhoods.  
Because hosts’ profile pages contain reviews (and pictures) from recent guests, we can 
cross-validate our experimental findings using observational data on whether the host has 
recently had an African-American guest. We find that discrimination is concentrated 
among hosts with no African-American guests in their review history. When we restrict 
our analysis to hosts who have had an African-American guest in the recent past, 
discrimination disappears – reinforcing the external validity of our main results, and 
suggesting that discrimination is concentrated among a subset of hosts.  
To explore the cost to a host of discriminating, we check whether each listing is 
ultimately rented for the weekend we inquired about. Combining that information with 
the price of each listing, we estimate that a host incurs a cost of roughly $65-$100 in 
foregone revenue by rejecting an African-American guest.   
Overall, our results suggest a cause for concern. While discrimination has shrunk in 
more regulated offline markets, it arises and persists in online markets. Government 
agencies at both the federal and state level have routinely conducted audit studies to test 
for racial discrimination since 1955 in offline markets. One might imagine implementing 
                                                 
3 Doleac & Stein (2013) find a 62% to 56% gap in offer rates for online classified postings. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) find 
a 10% to 6% gap in callback rates for jobs. Pope & Sydnor (2011) find a 9% to 6% gap in lending rates in an online lending market. 
Ayres et al. (2005) find a 20% to 13% gap in how often taxi drivers receive a tip. 
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regular audits in online markets as well; indeed, online audits might be easier to run at 
scale due to improved data access and reduced implementation cost. 
Our results also reflect the design choices that Airbnb and other online marketplaces 
use. It is not clear a priori how online markets will affect discrimination. To the extent 
that online markets can be more anonymous than in-person transactions, there may 
actually be less room for discrimination. For example, Ayres and Siegelman (1995) find 
that African-American car buyers pay a higher price than white car buyers at dealerships, 
whereas Morton et al. (2003) find no such racial difference in online purchases. 
Similarly, platforms such as Amazon, eBay, and Expedia offer little scope for 
discrimination, as sellers effectively pre-commit to accept all buyers regardless of race or 
ethnicity. However, these advantages are by no means guaranteed, and in fact they 
depend on design choices made by each online platform. In this situation, Airbnb’s 
design choices enable widespread discrimination.   
I. About Airbnb 
Airbnb is a popular online marketplace for short-term rentals. Founded in 2008, the site 
gained traction quickly and, as of November 2015, it offers 2,000,000 listings 
worldwide. 4  This is more than three times as many as Marriott’s 535,000 rooms 
worldwide. Airbnb reports serving over 40 million guests in more than 190 countries.  
While the traditional hotel industry is dominated by hotels and inns that each offer 
many rooms, Airbnb enables anyone to post even a single room that is vacant only 
occasionally. Hosts provide a wealth of information about each listing, including the type 
of property (house, apartment, boat, or even castle, of which there are over 1400 listed), 
the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, the price, and location. Each host also posts 
information about herself. An interested guest can see a host’s profile picture as well as 
reviews from past guests. Airbnb encourages prospective guests to confirm availability 
by clicking a listing’s “Contact” button to write to the host.5 In our field experiments 
                                                 
4 https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us  
5 See “How do I know if a listing is available”, https://www.airbnb.com/help/question/137. 
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(described in the next section), we use that method to evaluate a host’s receptiveness to a 
booking from a given guest. 
II Experimental Design 
A. Sample and data collection 
We collected data on all properties offered on Airbnb in Baltimore, Dallas, Los 
Angeles, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C. as of July 2015. Our goal was to collect data 
from the top twenty metropolitan areas from the 2010 census. We started with these five 
cities because they had varying levels of Airbnb usage and came from diverse geographic 
regions. Baltimore, Dallas, and St. Louis offer several hundred listings each, while Los 
Angeles and Washington, D.C. have several thousand. We stopped data collection after 
these five cities because Airbnb became increasingly rapid in blocking our automated 
tools which logged into guest accounts and communicated with hosts. (We considered 
taking steps to conceal our methods from Airbnb, but ultimately declined to do so.)  
Because some hosts offer multiple listings, we selected only one listing per host using a 
random number generator. This helped to reduce the burden on any given host, and it also 
prevented a single host from receiving multiple identical emails. Each host was contacted 
for no more than one transaction in our experiment. 
We also collected data from each host’s profile page. This allowed us to analyze host 
characteristics in exceptional detail. First, we saved the host’s profile image. We then 
employed Mechanical Turk workers to assess each host image for race (White, African-
American, Asian, Hispanic, multiracial, unknown), gender (male, female, two people of 
the same gender, two people of different genders, unknown), and age (young, middle-
aged, old). We hired two Mechanical Turk workers to assess each image, and if the 
workers disagreed on race or gender, we hired a third to settle the dispute. If all three 
workers disagreed (as happened, for example, for a host whose profile picture was an 
image of a sea turtle), we manually coded the picture. We coded race as “unknown” 
when the picture did not show a person. Through this procedure, we roughly categorized 
hosts by race, gender, and age.  
Profile pages also revealed other variables of interest. We noted the number of 
properties each host offers on Airbnb, anticipating that professional hosts with multiple 
forthcoming, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 
 6 
properties might discriminate less often than others. We retrieved the number of reviews 
the host has received, a rough measure of whether the host is an avid Airbnb user or a 
casual one. We further checked the guests who had previously reviewed each host. 
Airbnb posts the photo of each such guest, so we used Face++, a face-detection API, to 
categorize past guests by race, gender, and age.6 This allows us to examine relationships 
between a host’s prior experience with African-American guests and the host’s rejection 
of new African-American requests. 
We also collected information about each listing. We recorded the price of the listing, 
the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, the cancelation policy, any cleaning fee, and the 
listing’s ratings from past guests. We also measured whether the listing offered an entire 
unit versus a room in a larger unit, yielding a proxy for how much the host interacts with 
the guest.  
Each listing included a longitude and latitude, which allowed us to link to census 
demographic data to assess the relationship between neighborhood demographics and 
discrimination. After linking the latitude and longitude to a census tract, we used census 
data on the number of African-American, Hispanic, Asian, and White individuals. Table 
1 presents summary statistics about the hosts and listings as well as balanced treatment 
tests. 
[ Insert Table 1 Here ] 
We later checked each listing to see whether hosts were ultimately able to fill openings. 
Our guests inquired about reservations eight weeks in advance. Thus, if a guest sent a 
message on August 1 about the weekend of September 25, we checked on Friday, 
September 24 to see whether the specified listing was still listed as available.  
                                                 
6 In addition to detecting race, gender, and age, Face++ estimates its confidence for each trait. When Face++ was unable to make a 
match or its confidence was below 95 out of 100, we used Mechanical Turk, to categorize the past guest via the method described 
above. 
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B. Treatment groups 
Our analysis used four main treatment groups based on the perceived race and gender 
of the test guest accounts. Hosts were contacted by guests with names that signaled 
African-American males, African-American females, White males, and White females, 
drawn from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). The list was based on the frequency of 
names from birth certificates of babies born between 1974 and 1979 in Massachusetts. 
Distinctively White names are those that are most likely to be White, conditional on the 
name, and similarly for distinctively African-American names. To validate the list, we 
conducted a survey in which we asked participants to quickly categorize each name as 
White or African-American. With just three seconds permitted for a response, survey 
takers had little time to think beyond a gut response. The survey results, presented in 
Appendix Table 1, confirm that the names continue to signal race.7 
We then created twenty Airbnb accounts, identical in all respects except for guest 
names. Our names included ten that are distinctively African-American and ten 
distinctively White names, divided into five male and five female names within each 
group. To avoid the confounds that would result from pictures, we use only names; our 
Airbnb profiles include no picture of the putative guest. From these twenty guest 
accounts, we sent messages to prospective hosts. Each host was randomly assigned one 
of our twenty guest accounts. Figure 1 presents a representative email from one of our 
guests to an Airbnb host. The name and dates changed depending on the message sender 
and when the message was sent.8 In choosing the dates, we asked hosts about a weekend 
that was approximately eight weeks distant from when the message was sent. We limited 
our search to those properties that were listed as available during the weekend in 
question.  
[ Insert Figure 1 Here ] 
                                                 
7 On a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 is African-American, the White female names each had an average survey response of 0.90 or 
above, and the African-American female names all had an average score of 0.10 or below. The male names showed slightly more 
variation but tell the same story: all the White male names scored 0.88 or above, and all the African-American male names except for 
Jermaine Jones scored 0.10 or below. The Appendix presents the full results of the survey. 
8 No more than 48 hours elapsed between our first contact to a host in a given city, and the completion of our contacting hosts in 
that city. Furthermore, no hosts in our sample had listings in more than one of the five cities we tested. Hence, it is unlikely that a host 
contacted later on in the study would have learned about the experiment. 
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C. Experimental procedure 
We sent roughly 6,400 messages to hosts between July 7, 2015 and July 30, 2015.9 
Each message inquired about availability during a specific weekend in September. When 
a host replied to a guest, we replied to the host with a personal message clarifying that we 
(as the guest) were still not sure if we would visit the city or if we would need a place to 
stay. We sent this reply in order to reduce the likelihood of a host holding inventory for 
one of our hypothetical guests. 
We tracked host responses over the 30 days that followed each request. A research 
assistant then coded each response into categories. The majority of responses were in one 
of six groups: “No response” (if the host did not respond within 30 days); “No or listing 
is unavailable”; “Yes”; “Request for more information” (if the host responded with 
questions for the guest); “Yes, with questions” (if the host approved the stay but also 
asked questions); “Check back later for definitive answer”; and “I will get back to you.” 
As these categories show, our initial categorizations used subtle distinctions between 
possible responses. In our analyses below, however, we restrict our attention to the 
simplest response – “Yes” – though all of our results are robust to using “No” instead, as 
well as to ignoring non-responses or to using broader definitions of “Yes.”  
We collected all data using scrapers we built for this purpose. We sent inquiries to 
Airbnb hosts using web browser automation tools we built for this purpose. Our 
Institutional Review Board approved our methods before we began collecting data.  
III. Results 
Table 2 presents the main effect. We find that inquiries from guests with White-
sounding names are accepted roughly 50% of the time. In contrast, guests with African-
American-sounding names are accepted roughly 42% of the time. Columns 2 and 3 
introduce additional control variables related to the host or the property. The effect stays 
                                                 
9 Our initial goal was to collect roughly 10,000 responses. This was based on a power analysis, which in turn used an effect size 
calculated from Edelman and Luca (2014). To find a similar effect size, we would need a sample size of roughly 3,000 hosts. But, to 
calculate an effect among a subgroup of hosts, like African-American hosts, which represent roughly 7% of the Airbnb population, we 
would need a sample size closer to 10,000. We fell short of this goal for an exogenous reason: Airbnb shut down the experimental 
accounts after we collected roughly 6,400 responses.  
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constant at a roughly eight percentage point gap across these specifications, controlling 
for the host’s gender, race, an indicator for whether the host has multiple listings, an 
indicator for whether the property is shared, host experience (whether the host has more 
than ten reviews), and the log of the listing price. 
[ Insert Table 2 Here ] 
As noted, we break down hosts’ responses into 11 categories. Figure 2 shows the 
frequency of each response by race. One might worry that results are driven by 
differences in host responses that are hard to classify, such as conditional “Yes” 
responses. Similarly, we would be concerned if our findings were driven by differences 
in response rate. African-American accounts might be more likely to be categorized as 
spam, or hosts may believe that African-American accounts are more likely to be fake, in 
which case one might expect higher non-response rates for African-American accounts. 
But as Figure 2 shows, the discrimination results occur because of differences in simple 
“Yes” or “No” responses, not because of non-responses or intermediate responses (like a 
conditional “Yes”). 
[ Insert Figure 2 Here ] 
In the rest of this section, we use the wealth of data available on Airbnb about the host 
and location for each listing to look for factors that influence the gap between white and 
African-American names. Does the identity of the host matter? Does the location of the 
property matter? Generally, we find that the discrimination is remarkably robust.  
A. Effects by host characteristics 
We first check whether our finding changes based on the identity of the host. If 
discrimination is driven by homophily (in-group bias), then the host’s race should matter. 
According to this theory, hosts might simply prefer guests of the same race. If homophily 
were the primary factor driving differential guest acceptance rates, then African-
American guests would face higher acceptance rates from African-American hosts. Table 
3 presents regressions that include guest race, host race, and an interaction term. Across 
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the entire sample of hosts, the interaction between the race and guest of the host is not 
significantly different from zero, but the point estimate is noisy. This result masks 
heterogeneity across genders. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 report the same regression 
limited to male hosts and female hosts, respectively. Among male hosts, the interaction 
between the host’s race and guest’s race shows a widening of the race gap by 11 
percentage points, whereas among females, the race gap narrows by 11 percentage points. 
Both estimates are noisy; we cannot reject coefficients of zero.10 
[ Insert Table 3 Here ] 
[ Insert Table 4 Here ] 
Discrimination may also be influenced by a host’s proximity to the guest. For example, 
Becker (1957) formalizes racial discrimination as distaste for interactions with 
individuals of a certain race. On Airbnb, a host must classify each listing as offering an 
entire unit, a room within a unit, or a shared room. We classify anything other than an 
entire unit as a “shared property.” Column 1 of Table 5 shows that the race gap is roughly 
the same whether or not a property is shared. (In unreported results, we find that the race 
gap stays roughly the same in shared properties with only one bathroom.) 
One might expect a distinction between casual Airbnb hosts who occasionally rent out 
their homes, versus professional hosts who offer multiple properties. Roughly a sixth of 
Airbnb hosts manage multiple properties, and roughly 40% of hosts have at least 10 
reviews from past guests. Columns 2 and 3 explore the extent of discrimination among 
hosts with multiple locations, and those with more than 10 reviews. Across these 
specifications, the race gap persists with roughly the same magnitude.11  
                                                 
10 Table 4 explores the effect of the host’s race with more nuance. It shows the proportion of Yes responses from each gender/race 
cell among hosts in response to each gender/race cell among guests. African-American male hosts discriminate against African-
American male and female guests. White hosts of both genders are more likely to accept white guests of either gender. African-
American female hosts are the only exception: they accept African-American female guests more than any other group. Thus, with the 
exception of African-American females, the data is inconsistent with homophily. Table 4 focuses on race/gender subgroups, but we 
present a more systematic breakdown of the raw results in Appendix Table 2. We ultimately focused on race/gender cells for ease of 
presentation. 
11 Hosts with at least 10 reviews still have a race gap, but the acceptance rates for both races are higher among these hosts. Instead 
of the 50% to 42% gap we see among all hosts, the race gap among hosts with at least 10 reviews, or hosts with multiple properties, is 
closer to 60% to 52%. Hence, the racial gap is the same in terms of percentage points, but not in terms of percent. The same is true in a 
later specification, where we look at the race gap among hosts with at least one review from an African-American guest. In all these 
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To the extent that discrimination rates are changing over time, one might expect 
discrimination to be less common among younger hosts. To assess this possibility, we 
employed Mechanical Turk workers to categorize hosts as young, middle-aged, or old. 
Column 4 shows that discrimination also persists across the age categories with roughly 
the same magnitude. 
[ Insert Table 5 Here ] 
B. Effects by listing characteristics  
Just as discrimination was robust across host characteristics, we find that 
discrimination does not vary based on the cost or location of the property. Column 1 of 
Table 6 shows that, overall, listings above the median price are more likely to reject 
inquiries. However, discrimination remains both among more expensive and less 
expensive listings.  
We can also check whether the listing was eventually filled (for the nights in question) 
to create a proxy for the desirability of the listing. First, we fit a Probit model to predict 
the likelihood that the listing was filled, controlling for a fixed city effect and a host of 
covariates.12 Then we assign each listing a probability of being filled. This lets us test 
whether discrimination changes based on the listing’s desirability.13 It does not. 
We also hypothesized that the extent of discrimination might vary with the diversity of 
a neighborhood. More generally, one might expect that geography matters and that 
discrimination is worse in some areas than others, due to market structure or underlying 
rates of discrimination among a population. Merging data on neighborhoods by census 
tract, Column 2 shows that the extent of discrimination does not vary with the proportion 
of nearby residents who are African-American. Column 3 shows that discrimination is 
ubiquitous: it does not vary with the number of Airbnb listings within the census tract. 
We also find discrimination in all cities in our sample, as shown in Appendix Table 3.  
                                                                                                                                                 
specifications, the change in the odds ratio is not economically significant. We have insufficient statistical power to reject the 
possibility that the odds ratios remain constant while the gap changes slightly. 
12 The covariates are as follows: the host’s race and gender, the price, number of bedrooms, whether the property is shared, 
whether the bathroom is shared, the number of reviews, the age of the host, whether the host operates multiple listings, the proportion 
of White people in the census tract, and the number of Airbnb listings in the census tract. 
13 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach. 
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[ Insert Table 6 Here ] 
C. Robustness – effects by name 
Table 7 shows the proportion of positive responses broken down by name. The effect is 
robust across choice of names. For example, the African-American female name with the 
most positive responses (Tamika) received fewer positive responses than the White 
female name with the fewest positive responses (Kristen), though this difference is not 
statistically significant. Similarly, the African-American males with the most positive 
responses (Darnell and Rasheed) received fewer acceptances than the White male with 
the fewest positive responses (Brad).  
[ Insert Table 7 Here ] 
D. Comparing experimental results with observational patterns 
Each listing page includes reviews from previous guests, along with profile pictures for 
these guests. This allows us to see which hosts previously accepted African-American 
guests (although not all guests leave reviews and not all guests have photos that reveal 
their race). We use this data to assess the external validity of our results.  
We collected profile pictures from the ten most recent reviews on each listing page. We 
categorized these past guests by race and gender, finding that 29% of hosts in our sample 
had at least one review from an African-American guest. We then regressed the 
likelihood of a host responding positively to our inquiry on the race of the guest, whether 
the host has at least one recent review from an African-American guest, and an 
interaction between these variables. Column 5 of Table 5 reports the results. We find that 
the race gap drops sharply among hosts with at least one recent review from an African-
American guest. We cannot reject zero difference for requests from our African-
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American test accounts versus requests from our White test accounts, though this result is 
only significant at the 10% level.14  
This finding reinforces our interpretation of our main effects, including the role of race 
and the interpretation that observed differences reflect racial discrimination by Airbnb 
hosts. Put another way, if our findings are driven by a quirk of our experimental design, 
rather than race, then it is difficult to explain why the race gap disappears precisely 
among hosts with a history of accepting African-American guests.  
E. Importance of profile pictures and more complete profiles 
 A related concern is that we used guest profiles that were relatively bare. A host 
may hesitate to accept a guest without a profile picture or past reviews. Of course, this 
alone cannot explain the race gap, since both white and African-American guests had 
bare profiles. But it does raise the question of whether more complete profiles could 
mitigate discrimination.15  
 Internal data from Airbnb and observational data on Airbnb users both suggest 
that profile pictures alone are unlikely to make much difference. With access to internal 
Airbnb data, Fradkin (2015) looks at roughly 17,000 requests sent to hosts and finds that 
guests are rejected 49% of the time. Notably, these requests from ordinary Airbnb users, 
with typical Airbnb profiles, were rejected at a rate similar to that of our guests. In our 
experiment, as detailed in Appendix Table 4, 44% of guests were rejected or received no 
response. Another 11% received a message from a host requesting more information. The 
remaining 46% were accepted. The similarity in rejection rates suggests that 
incompleteness of our guests’ profiles is not likely to be causing a change in the rejection 
rate, and reinforces the ecological validity of our experimental design. 
                                                 
14 These findings are robust to alternative specifications of a host’s past guests. The same substantive results hold if we look at the 
raw number of reviews from African-Americans, rather than whether there is at least one such review. The same is true if we use the 
proportion of reviews from African-American guests. 
15 Similarly, our experiment does not assess whether discrimination occurs because of race or social class. Hanson & Hawley 
(2011) find, in a field experiment on Craigslist’s housing market using similar methodology, that renters with African-American 
names face a penalty, but that the penalty decreases if the email sent to a landlord signals higher social class. Under some 
specifications, African-Americans face a statistically significant penalty based on race and an additional penalty for signaling low 
class, also statistically significant. Under other specifications, the racial gap is not statistically significant when comparing white and 
African-American guests who both signal high social class. On the whole, the paper indicates that social class and race both play a 
role. 
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Other methods indicate that profile pictures seem to have little impact on acceptance 
decisions. In a logistic regression estimating the probability of receiving a rejection from 
a host, again using internal Airbnb data, Fradkin (2015) finds that including a profile 
picture has no significant effect. This matches the observational data we collect: in a 
random selection of Airbnb users, we found that only 44% have a profile picture. The 
proportion of guests with a profile picture is higher among users who have left a review, 
but nonetheless both analyses indicate that the existence of profile pictures plays a small 
role in host decision-making. Further, even if profile pictures impact rejection rates, it is 
not clear that the impact should be differential by race. For example, one might expect 
that pictures would make a guest’s race more salient. If our results are driven by race, 
then our findings would be a lower bound on the true effect. 
One limitation of our experiment is that we do not observe the effect of past reviews on 
discrimination. If our findings are driven by statistical discrimination, positive reviews 
from previous hosts may reduce the extent of discrimination. However, three factors 
suggest that reviews are an incomplete response to a discrimination problem. First, our 
acceptance rates are similar to overall acceptance rates on Airbnb (Fradkin 2015), which 
indicates that hosts are not treating our test guest accounts differently for lack of reviews, 
meaning that reviews would be unlikely to eliminate discrimination. Indeed, for reviews 
to eliminate discrimination, they would need to provide a 16 percent differential increase 
in acceptance rates for African-Americans, relative to White guests.  Second, all Airbnb 
users necessarily start without past reviews, so a review system would not address any 
initial barriers to entry that guests face. Third, a subjective review system can itself allow 
or facilitate discrimination. (See, e.g., Goldin and Rouse, 2000, finding that visually 
confirming a musician’s gender may influence an expert’s judgment of her work.) 
Whatever mechanism is causing a lower acceptance rate for the African-American guests 
may also cause a worse rating. 
F. How much does discrimination cost hosts? 
A host incurs a cost for discriminating when rejecting a guest causes a unit to remain 
empty. The expected cost depends on the likelihood of the property remaining vacant, 
which in turn depends on the thickness of the market. If a host can easily find a 
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replacement guest, then discrimination is nearly costless for the host. But if a property 
remains vacant after the host rejects a guest, then discrimination imposes a more 
significant cost. In other words, the impact on net revenue from discriminating depends 
on the likelihood of filling a unit with someone of the host’s preferred race after rejecting 
a guest of a disfavored race.  
Because we collect data about each property’s availability after a host declines a guest, 
we can estimate the cost in net revenue from discrimination. Suppose a host charges price 
p for a listing and pays listing fees f to Airbnb. Let πreplace be the probability of filling the 
property after rejecting a guest in our study. Then the cost in net revenue of 
discrimination is as follows: 
ΔNet Revenue = (p - f) - πreplace ∙ (p – f) = (1 - πreplace ) ∙ (p – f) 
 
That is, the cost of discrimination, in terms of net revenue, is the revenue that the host 
forgoes if the listing remains empty multiplied by the probability that the listing remains 
empty. 
In our data, hosts who rejected or never responded to our inquiries had properties with 
a median price of $163 and a mean price of $295.16 The numbers are similar and slightly 
higher if we restrict the sample further to those hosts who rejected African-American 
guests, or if we expand the sample to hosts who responded positively Yes to our 
accounts.17 Airbnb charges each host a fee equal to 3% of the listing price. 
After our inquiries, roughly 25.9% of the listings in our study remained vacant on the 
dates we requested after rejecting or not responding to one of our guests. Another 37.9% 
remained listed but were no longer available on those dates, suggesting that the host 
either found another guest or decided to no longer make the property available on the 
specified dates. The remaining 36.1% of properties were no longer listed on Airbnb. 
                                                 
16 In calculating price, we sum the listing price and any cleaning fee. 
17 An anonymous reviewer correctly points out that the host we are interested in is the host on the margin of discriminating. But 
there are hosts far from this margin both within the group of hosts who said Yes and within the group of hosts who said No. 
Nonetheless, our calculations in this section are not sensitive to which group of hosts we include. When including hosts who said Yes, 
the median price drops from $163 to $150, and the probability of finding a replacement guest rises to 64% instead of 59.4% 
(excluding disappearing hosts) or 45% instead of 37.9% (including disappearing hosts). Thus, the cost of discrimination drops by 
about $10 or $20 among hosts who say Yes, and therefore either did not discriminate against the African-American accounts or did 
not get a chance to do so.  
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Because it is unclear whether the hosts who exit should be excluded from the sample or 
treated as not having found a replacement, we develop two estimates.  
If we exclude these disappearing hosts from our calculation, 59.4% of hosts found a 
replacement guest. Setting p equal to the median price ($163) and fees at 3% of the 
median price:  
ΔNet Revenue = (1 - .594) • ($163 - .03 • $163) ≈ $64.19 
 
If we treat disappearing listings as vacancies, in effect assuming that the host of a 
dropped listing was not able to find a replacement guest, then only 37.9% of hosts found 
a replacement guest. The cost of discrimination rises as a result:  
ΔNet Revenue = (1 - .379) • ($163 - .03 • $163) ≈ $98.19 
 
In this analysis, we focus on the net revenue, which does not incorporate the marginal 
cost of each night the listing is rented, since we do not directly observe costs. The cost of 
hosting includes various types of host effort or wear-and-tear to the property. In principle, 
hosting also entails a risk of damage by a guest, though throughout the relevant period 
Airbnb automatically provided all hosts with property insurance, which reduces the risk. 
Our calculation also excludes unobserved benefits of hosting, such as the possibility that 
a positive review draws more guests in the future and improves the listing position on 
Airbnb. A full estimate of profit would also need to consider the time cost of looking for 
new guests after rejecting someone on the basis of race.18 
While these estimates are clearly noisy, they suggest that hosts incur a real cost by 
discriminating. The median host who rejects a guest because of race is turning down 
between $65 and $100 of revenue. 
                                                 
18 Our calculation also ignores other factors that cut in both directions. Responding with a Yes to a guest does not provide 100% 
certainty of a paid booking; the guest may choose another option or may not make the trip. In that case, our estimates overstate the 
revenue loss. Similarly, we have imperfect information about whether a host found a replacement guest. Among other complexities, 
our guests requested two-night stays; we treat a host as having filled a listing if the host found a replacement guest for at least one of 
the nights, though a host who filled only one of the nights has nonetheless lost one night of revenue.  
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IV. Discussion 
Online platforms such as Airbnb create new markets by eliminating search frictions, 
building trust, and facilitating transactions (Lewis 2011, Luca forthcoming). With the rise 
of the sharing economy, however, comes a level of discrimination that is impossible in 
the online hotel reservations process. Clearly, the manager of a Holiday Inn cannot 
examine names of potential guests and reject them based on race or socioeconomic status 
or some combination of the two. Yet, this is commonplace on Airbnb, which now 
accounts for a growing share of the short-term rental market.  
Our results contribute to a small but growing body of literature suggesting that 
discrimination persists—and we argue may even be exacerbated—in online platforms. 
Edelman and Luca (2014) show that African-American hosts on Airbnb seek and receive 
lower prices than White hosts, controlling for the observable attributes of each listing. 
Pope and Sydnor (2011) find that loan listings with pictures of African-Americans on 
Prosper.com are less likely to be funded than similar listings with pictures of White 
borrowers. Doleac and Stein (2013) show that buyers are less likely to respond to 
Craigslist listings showing an iPod held by a Black hand compared to an identical ad with 
a White hand. In contrast, Morton et al. (2003) find no difference by race in price paid for 
cars in online purchases—a sharp contrast to traditional channels (see, e.g., List, (2004); 
Zhao et al., (2005)).  
One important limitation of our experiment is that we cannot identify the mechanism 
causing worse outcomes for guests with distinctively African-American names. Prior 
research shows that distinctively African-American names are correlated with lower 
socioeconomic status (Fryer and Levitt, 2004). Our findings cannot identify whether the 
discrimination is based on race, socioeconomic status, or a combination of these two. 
That said, we note that discrimination disappears among hosts who have previously 
accepted African-American guests. One might worry that discrimination against our test 
guest accounts results from our choice of names and hence does not represent patterns 
that affect genuine Airbnb guests. However, we find that discrimination is limited to 
hosts who have never had an African-American guest, which suggests that our results are 
consistent with any broader underlying patterns of discrimination.  
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Similarly, our experiment does not provide a sharp test of alternative models of 
discrimination. The theoretical literature on discrimination often distinguishes between 
statistical and taste-based discrimination. While our experimental design cannot reject 
either mechanism, our findings suggest a more nuanced story than either of the classic 
models. For one, we find homophily among African-American females, but not among 
other race/gender combinations. Furthermore, we find that discrimination is not sensitive 
to a measure of proximity between the host and guest. Both findings are in tension with 
pure taste-based discrimination. But we also find some evidence against pure statistical 
discrimination. As noted above, we find that hosts who have had an African-American 
guest in the past exhibit less discrimination than other hosts. This suggests that, at the 
very least, hosts are using different statistical models as they evaluate potential guests.  
A. Designing a discrimination-free marketplace 
Because online platforms choose which information is available to parties during a 
transaction, they can prevent the transmission of information that is irrelevant or 
potentially pernicious. Our results highlight a platform’s role in preventing discrimination 
or facilitating discrimination, as the case may be. If a platform aspires to provide a 
discrimination-free environment, its rules must be designed accordingly.  
Airbnb has several options to reduce discrimination. For example, it could conceal 
guest names, just as it already prevents transmission of email addresses and phone 
numbers so that guests and hosts cannot circumvent Airbnb’s platform and its fees. 
Communications on eBay’s platform have long used pseudonyms and automatic 
salutations, so Airbnb could easily implement that approach.  
Alternatively, Airbnb might further expand its “Instant Book” option, in which hosts 
accept guests without screening them first. Closer to traditional hotels and bed and 
breakfasts, this system would eliminate the opportunity for discrimination. This change 
also offers convenience benefits for guests, who can count on their booking being 
confirmed more quickly and with fewer steps. However, in our sample, only a small 
subset of hosts currently allow instant booking. Airbnb could push to expand the use of 
this feature, which would also serve the company’s broader goal of reducing search 
frictions. 
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More generally, our results suggest an important tradeoff for market designers, who set 
the rules of online platforms, including the pricing mechanisms (Einav et al 2013) and the 
information that is available and actionable at the time of transaction (Luca forthcoming). 
Market design principles have generally focused on increasing the information flow 
within a platform (Bolton et al 2013, Che and Horner 2014, Dai et al 2014, Fradkin et al 
2014), but we highlight a situation in which platforms may be providing too much 
information.  
B. Policy Implications 
Because the legal system grants considerable protection to online marketplaces, Airbnb 
is unlikely to be held liable for allowing discrimination on its platform. Within the United 
States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in hotels (and other public 
accommodations) based on race, color, religion, or national origin. But these laws appear 
to be a poor fit for the informal sharing economy, where private citizens rent out a room 
in their home (Belzer and Leong, forthcoming; Todisco, 2015). As discussed in Edelman 
and Luca (2014), any changes by Airbnb would likely be driven by ethical considerations 
or public pressure rather than law. In contrast, offline rental markets and hotels have been 
subject to significant regulation (as well as audit studies to test for discrimination) for 
decades. This contributes to worry among policy-makers that online short-term rental 
markets like Airbnb may be displacing offline markets, which are more heavily regulated 
(Schatz et al, 2016). One clear policy implication is that regulators may want to audit 
Airbnb hosts using an approach based on our paper—much like longstanding efforts to 
reduce discrimination in offline rental markets.  
One might have hoped that online markets would cure discrimination, and it seems a 
different design might indeed do so. Regrettably, our analysis indicates that at Airbnb, 
this is not yet the case. 
Invited Postscript: Airbnb Implements Market Design Changes 
Prior to this paper, Airbnb repeatedly ignored allegations of discrimination 
on the platform (Finley, 2016; Larson & Harris, 2016). In response to our 
study and growing user complaints, the company put together a task force 
forthcoming, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 
 20 
including former attorney general Eric Holder to propose a set of market 
design changes to reduce discrimination on the platform (Benner, 2016). 
On the same day this paper was accepted for publication in this journal, 
Airbnb announced the company’s planned changes. Changes include a goal 
of increasing the proportion of hosts who offer Instant Book (letting guests 
book instantly, without the host first seeing the guest's picture or name), a 
reminder to all users of the company’s anti-discrimination policy, 
increased training for Airbnb staff to assist users who report 
discrimination, and testing reduced prominent of guests’ photos.  However, 
as of the time of publication, Airbnb continued to reject suggestions to 
conceal guest photos and names before booking. 
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Figures 
 
FIGURE 1. SAMPLE TREATMENT 
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FIGURE 2. HOST RESPONSES BY RACE 
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variables Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
25th 
%ile 
75th 
%ile Obs. 
Mean, 
White 
Accounts 
Mean, 
African- 
American 
Accounts 
p-
value 
Host is White 0.63 0.48 0 1 6,392 0.64 0.63 0.15 
Host is African-American 0.08 0.27 0 0 6,392 0.08 0.08 0.97 
Host is female 0.38 0.48 0 1 6,392 0.38 0.37 0.44 
Host is male 0.30 0.46 0 1 6,392 0.3 0.3 0.90 
Price ($) 181.11 1,280.23 75 175 6,302 166.43 195.81 0.36 
Number of bedrooms 3.18 2.26 2 4 6,242 3.18 3.18 0.96 
Number of bathrooms 3.17 2.26 2 4 6,285 3.17 3.17 0.93 
Number of reviews 30.87 72.51 2 29 6,390 30.71 31.03 0.86 
Host has multiple listings 0.16 0.36 0 0 6,392 0.32 0.33 0.45 
Host has 1+ reviews from 
African-American guests 0.29 0.45 0 1 6,390 0.29 0.28 0.38 
Airbnb listings per 
Census tract 9.51 9.28 2 14 6,392 9.49 9.54 0.85 
% population African-
American (Census tract) 0.14 0.2 0.03 0.14 6,378 0.14 0.14 0.92 
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TABLE 2. THE IMPACT OF RACE ON LIKELIHOOD OF ACCEPTANCE 
 Dependent Variable: 1(Host Accepts) 
Guest is African-American -0.08 (0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.02) 
Host is African-American   
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.09 
(0.02) 
Host is Male   
-0.05 
(0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.01) 
Host has Multiple Listings   
 
 
0.09 
(0.02) 
Shared Property   
 
 
-0.07 
(0.02) 
Host has 10+ Reviews   
 
 
0.12 
(0.01) 
ln(Price)   
 
 
-0.06 
(0.01) 
Constant 0.49 (0.01) 
0.50 
(0.01) 
0.76 
(0.07) 
Observations 6,235 6,235 6,168 
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.009 0.040 
Notes: This table reports coefficients from a regression of a "Yes" response on the guest's race and various host 
and location characteristics. Standard errors are clustered by (guest name)*(city) and are reported in 
parentheses. 
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TABLE 3: RACE GAP BY RACE OF THE HOST  
 Dependent Variable: 1(Host Accepts) 
 All Hosts Male Hosts Female Hosts Other Hosts 
Guest is African-American -0.08 (0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.02) 
-0.07 
(0.03) 
Host is African-American 0.06 (0.03) 
0.19 
(0.05) 
-0.00 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
Host is African-American * 
Guest is African-American 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
0.11 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
(0.14) 
Constant 0.48 (0.01) 
0.44 
(0.02) 
0.50 
(0.02) 
0.50 
(0.02) 
Observations 6235 1854 2336 2045 
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.015 0.007 0.003 
Implied Coefficient on 
Guest is African-American 
+ Host is African-American 
* Guest is African-American 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.19 
(.08) 
0.02 
(.06) 
-0.12 
(0.14) 
Notes: This table reports coefficients from a regression of a "Yes" response on the guest's race, the host's race, 
and the interaction between the two. Other hosts are hosts we could not classify as male or female. Of the 2,045 
host pictures we could not classify for gender, 972 had a picture of a mixed-gender couple, 259 had a same-
gender couple, 603 had a picture without a human in it, and the rest could not be classified. Standard errors are 
clustered by (guest name)*(city) and are reported in parentheses. 
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TABLE 4. PROPORTION OF POSITIVE RESPONSES BY RACE AND GENDER 
  Guest Race / Gender 
  
White  
Male 
African-
American  
Male 
White  
Female 
African-
American  
Female 
H
os
t R
ac
e 
/ G
en
de
r 
White Male 0.42 0.35 0.49 0.32 
African-
American Male 0.64 0.40 0.59 0.43 
White Female 0.46 0.35 0.49 0.44 
African-
American Female 0.43 0.38 0.53 0.59 
Notes: This table shows the proportion of Yes responses by hosts of a certain race/gender to guests of a certain 
race/gender. 
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TABLE 5. ARE EFFECTS DRIVEN BY HOST CHARACTERISTICS? 
 Dependent Variable: 1(Host Accepts) 
Guest is African-American -0.07 (0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.02) 
-0.11 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.02) 
Shared Property 0.00 (0.01) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Shared Property * Guest is African-American -0.02 (0.03) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Host has Multiple Listings   
0.14 
(0.02) 
 
 
 
  
Host has Multiple Listings * Guest is African-
American 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
 
 
 
  
Host has 10+ Reviews   
 
 
0.14 
(0.02) 
 
  
Host has Ten+ Reviews * Guest is African-
American 
 
 
 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
 
  
Host Looks Young   
 
 
 
 
-0.03 
(0.02)  
Host Looks Young * Guest is African-
American 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.02)  
Host has 1+ reviews from an African-
American guest     
0.10 
(0.01) 
Host has 1+ reviews from an African-
American guest * Guest is African-American     
0.06 
(0.02) 
Constant 0.49 (0.01) 
0.46 
(0.01) 
0.42 
(0.01) 
0.50 
(0.01) 
0.46 
(0.01) 
Observations 6,235 6,235 6,235 6,235 6,235 
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.014 0.027 0.011 0.019 
Implied Coefficient on Guest is African-
American + Host Trait * Guest is African-
American 
-0.09 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.03) 
-0.08 
(0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.03) 
 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
 
Notes: This table reports coefficients from a regression of a "Yes" response on the guest's race, various host 
characteristics, and the interaction between the two. Standard errors are clustered by (guest name)*(city) and are 
reported in parentheses. 
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TABLE 6. ARE EFFECTS DRIVEN BY LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS? 
  Dependent Variable=1(Host Accepts) 
Guest is African-American -0.09
 
(0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.02) 
-0.12 
(0.06) 
Price > Median -0.07
 
(0.02)   
 
 
Guest is African-American *  
(Price > Median) 
0.01 
(0.03)   
 
 
Share of African-American Population in 
Census Tract  
0.05 
(0.05)  
 
 
Guest is African-American * (Share of 
African-American Population in Census Tract)  
0.02 
(0.08)  
 
 
Airbnb Listings per Census Tract   
-0.0007 
(0.0009) 
 
 
Guest is African-American *  
(Airbnb Listings per Census Tract)   
0.0008 
(0.001) 
 
 
Probability Listing is Filled 8 Weeks Later    0.56 (0.08) 
Guest is African-American *  
(Probability Listing is Filled 8 Weeks Later)    
0.09 
(0.12) 
Constant 0.52
 
(0.02) 
0.48 
(0.01) 
0.49 
(0.02) 
0.24 
(0.03) 
Observations 6235 6223 6235 6101 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.006 0.006 0.030 
Notes: This table reports coefficients from a regression of a "Yes" response on the guest's race, various location 
characteristics, and the interaction between the two. Standard errors are clustered by (guest name)*(city) and are 
reported in parentheses. 
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TABLE 7. PROPORTION OF POSITIVE RESPONSES, BY NAME 
Entire Sample 0.43  (6,390) 
White Female African-American Female 
Allison Sullivan 0.49  (306) Lakisha Jones 
0.42  
(324) 
Anne Murphy 0.56  (344) Latonya Robinson 
0.35  
(331) 
Kristen Sullivan 0.48  (325) Latoya Williams 
0.43  
(327) 
Laurie Ryan 0.50  (327) Tamika Williams 
0.47  
(339) 
Meredith O’Brien 0.49  (303) Tanisha Jackson 
0.40  
 (309) 
White Male African-American Male 
Brad Walsh 0.41  (317) Darnell Jackson 
0.38  
(285) 
Brent Baker 0.48  (332) Jamal Jones 
0.33  
(328) 
Brett Walsh 0.44  (279) Jermaine Jones 
0.36  
(300) 
Greg O’Brien 0.45  (312) Rasheed Jackson 
0.38  
(313) 
Todd McCarthy 0.43  (314) Tyrone Robinson 
0.36  
(254) 
Notes: The table reports the proportion of Yes responses by name. The number of messages sent 
by each guest name is shown in parentheses.  
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Appendix 
APPENDIX TABLE 1: RESULTS OF SURVEY TESTING RACES ASSOCIATED WITH NAMES  
White Female African-American Female 
Meredith O’Brien 0.93 Tanisha Jackson 0.03 
Anne Murphy 0.95 Lakisha Jones 0.05 
Laurie Ryan 0.97 Latoya Williams 0.05 
Allison Sullivan 0.98 Latonya Robinson 0.07 
Kristen Sullivan 1.00 Tamika Williams 0.07 
White Male African-American Male 
Greg O‘Brien 0.88 Tyrone Robinson 0.00 
Brent Baker 0.90 Rasheed Jackson 0.06 
Brad Walsh 0.91 Jamal Jones 0.07 
Brett Walsh 0.93 Darnell Jackson 0.10 
Todd McCarthy 0.98 Jermaine Jones 0.26 
Notes: “White” is coded as 1. “African-American” is coded as 0. Sample size = 62.  
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APPENDIX TABLE 2: RAW DISCRIMINATION ACROSS ALL RACE AND GENDER GROUPS 
  Guest Race / Gender 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) 
P-
value 
(9) (10) 
  White  
Male 
African-
American  
Male 
White  
Female 
African-
American  
Female 
Male Female White African-American 
H
os
t R
ac
e 
/ G
en
de
r 
White  
Male 0.42 0.35 0.49 0.32 0.39 0.4 
0.72 
0.45 0.34 
African-
American Male 0.64 0.40 0.59 0.43 0.52 0.51 
0.99 
0.62 0.42 
White  
Female 0.46 0.35 0.49 0.44 0.41 0.46 
0.06 
0.48 0.39 
African-
American Female 0.43 0.38 0.53 0.59 0.41 0.56 
0.02 
0.48 0.50 
White 0.45 0.36 0.50 0.40 0.41 0.45 
0.02 
0.47 0.38 
African-
American 0.49 0.40 0.58 0.52 0.45 0.55 
0.02 
0.53 0.46 
Other or 
uncertain 0.45 0.38 0.51 0.43 0.41 0.47 
0.03 
0.48 0.40 
Male 0.43 0.36 0.47 0.35 0.40 0.41 
0.80 
0.45 0.35 
Female 
0.47 0.34 0.51 0.45 0.41 0.48 
0.004 
0.49 0.40 
Other or 
uncertain 0.45 0.41 0.54 0.45 0.43 0.50 
0.003 
0.50 0.43 
Notes: This table shows the proportion of Yes responses by hosts of a certain race/gender to guests of a certain 
race/gender. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3: DISCRIMINATION BY CITY 
Dependent Variable: 1(Host Accepts) 
 All Cities 
Baltimore 
(N = 347) 
Dallas 
(N = 
415) 
Los 
Angeles 
(N = 3,913) 
St. Louis 
(N = 151) 
Washington, 
D.C. 
(N = 1,559) 
Guest is African-
American -0.08 
-0.07 
(0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.02) 
-0.10 
(0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.03) 
-0.08 
(0.02) 
City -- 0.07 (0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
City * Guest is 
African-American -- 
-0.12 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
Constant 0.49 0.48 (0.01) 
0.49 
(0.01) 
0.49 
(0.02) 
0.49 
(0.01) 
0.50 
(0.01) 
Observations 6,235 6,235 6,235 6,235 6,235 6,235 
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 
Implied Coefficient 
on Guest is African-
American + City * 
Guest is African-
American 
-- -0.19 (0.04) 
-0.09 
(0.04) 
-0.07 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.05) 
Notes: This table reports coefficients from a regression of a "Yes" response on the guest's race, a city, and the 
interaction of city and guest race. Standard errors are clustered by (guest name)*(city) and are reported in 
parentheses. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 4: HOST RESPONSES TO GUEST INQUIRIES, BY RACE OF THE GUEST 
 
White Guests 
African-American 
Guests 
Yes 1,152 940 
Yes, but request for more information 375 308 
Yes, with lower price if booked now 11 10 
Yes, if guest extends stay 10 15 
Yes, but in a different property 18 8 
Yes, at a higher price 4 0 
Request for more information 339 323 
Not sure or check back later 154 175 
No response 429 423 
No unless more information is provided 12 15 
No 663 873 
Notes: The table reports the frequency of each type of host response to a guest inquiry, by race of the guest. 
Likelihood-ratio chi-squared = 68.61 (p<.01).  Null hypothesis is that the columns will have equal proportions 
for each type of response 
 
